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ABSTRACT
Web browser vendors offer a portable web browser option which is considered as one of the
features that provides user privacy. Portable web browser is a browser that can be launched from
a USB flash drive without the need for its installation on the host machine. Most popular web
browsers have portable versions of their browsers as well. Portable web browsing poses a great
challenge to computer forensic investigators who try to reconstruct the past browsing history, in
case of any computer incidence. This research examines various sources in the host machine such
as physical memory, temporary, recent, event files, Windows Registry, and Cache.dll files for the
evidential information regarding portable browsing session. The portable browsers under this study
include Firefox, Chrome, Safari, and Opera. Results of this experiment show that portable web
browsers do not provide user-privacy as they are expected to do.
Keywords: computer forensics tools, RAM forensics, volatile memory, forensics artifacts,
Registry

INTRODUCTION
When surfing the web, browsers save
information about the surfing activities in
various locations. In an attempt to maintain
privacy of web browsing, most major web
browsers have a portable version of their
browsers. A portable browser is a browser that
can be saved on a removable storage media
such as a USB flash drive. The browser can
then be launched from the flash drive without
the need for its installation on the host
machine (Choi, et al, 2012). From computerforensics point of view, browsing artifacts can
be saved on the portable browser flash drive,
server and the host machine. The local
machine saves browsing data in both static
media such as hard drive as well as random
access memory (RAM), also known as volatile
© 2016 ADFSL

memory (Aggarwal and Jackson, 2010). The
data that is contained within the two types of
sources varies significantly. Static media is
primarily used for long term storage and
contains data such as executables, images,
documents, and browser history. On the other
hand, physical memory is a temporary working
space for data that are being used by the
system. The major difference between the data
sources in relation to a computer-forensic
investigation is that the latter is a less tangible
source of evidence (Simmons & Slay, 2009).
Forensics artifacts left after a portable
browsing session can be retrieved from sources
such as caches, history, cookies, and download
file lists (Davis, 2009). On the other hand,
retrieving portable browsing forensics artifacts
left behind from main memory have recently
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attracted some attention (Oh et al, 2011)
(Shashidhar, 2013). The authors have used
limited memory forensics to retrieve forensics
data left after a portable browsing session.
They argue that memory forensics is very
promising in establishing a link between the
suspect and the retrieved data.
When we are dealing with portable
browsing artifacts, memory forensics would be
challenging because once we remove the
portable browser flash media from the suspect
machine, the portable browser-related data
content in the main memory will gradually be
deleted.
The focus of this research is the
examination of various sources such as main
memory, temporary files, recent files, event
files, Windows Registry, and Cache.dll file in
the suspect machine looking for residual
artifacts left behind after private portable web
browsing
activities.
The
research
experimentally analyzes both static media
sources such as hard drive as well as volatile
memory for their evidential potential related to
portable web browser activities. The portable
browsers under this study include Firefox,
Google Chrome, Opera and Safari.
To
evaluate the effectiveness of browser closure
after a browsing session, the experiment is
carried out in two cases: 1) portable browser
flash drive left attached to the suspect machine
after a browsing session and 2) portable
browser flash drive was removed from the
suspect machine after a browsing session. The
results will be tabulated for comparison
purposes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows: Section 2 gives literature review,
section 3 provides research methodology,
results appear in section 4, section 5 covers
conclusion and future research is presented in
section 6.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, we review the previous work on
portable browsing forensics. We study portable
browsing artifacts retrievable from static media
and from main memory.

Static Media Forensics
Static media forensics related to the artifacts
left due a portable browsing session has been
studied by various researchers. For example,
Marrington et al (2013) has examined privacy
of Google Chrome portable web browser using
conventional forensics by taking an image of
the hard drive after a portable browsing
session and analyzed the image. The details of
the analysis are not clear in their paper. They
reported that portable Google Chrome does
leave traces of browsing activities on the hard
drive. In another research, privacy of the
portable Google Chrome has been studied by
Adautin and Meeran (2015). The researchers
examined the content of the IconCache.db
database as well as Windows Registry and
reported that they found evidence of portable
browsing activities. They claim that they
examined the content of volatile memory;
however, other than making some general
recommendations, the authors provided no
details of their RAM forensics process. It is
worthwhile to notice that in both cases of hard
drive forensics and volatile memory forensic,
they left the portable flash drive connected to
the suspect machine during their experiment.
Dharan and Meeran (2014) have reported
that portable web browsing activities can be
obtained by searching the Windows Registry
and Prefetch files. The researchers performed
both live and offline forensics and reported
evidence of portable web browsing activities in
both cases. However, their experiment
description is very fuzzy and they did not
disclose the portable browser with which they
experimented.

© 2016 ADFSL
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Memory Forensics
Memory forensics involves two steps, memory
capture and analysis of the captured memory.
RAM capture is the process of making an
image of the physical memory and saving it as
a file on an external storage media. Memory
analysis involves parsing the data structure
tree of the captured memory file, looking for
processes that were running when the memory
was taken as well as other data such as
passwords, downloaded files, SSL Certificates,
URLs, etc. To facilitate memory forensics,
several open-source and proprietary RAM
forensics tools have been developed. Some
examples include Volatility (2015), Redline
(2015), and WinHex (2015).
One of the most comprehensive portable
browsing forensics researches is the work of
Ohana and Shashidhar (2013). Along with
other forensics investigation methods, the
researchers performed RAM forensics with
three portable web browsers, namely Mozilla
Firefox portable, Google Chrome portable, and
Opera portable. They conclude that the best
way to recover residual data is to obtain the
evidence from RAM, but that is not always
possible for investigators. Also, they did not
disclose whether, during the RAM capture, the
portable flash drive was connected to the
suspect machine or not. Based on our own
results, we believe the researchers captured
RAM while the portable flash drive was still
attached to the suspect machine.
Oh, et al. (2012) demonstrated that web
browsing activities can be obtained from the
web browser’s log file. They suggest that
current tools are not adequate for this task.
Consequently, they developed a tool called
WEF. This tool provides an integrated analysis
function for various web browsers in various
time zones. In addition, online user activity,
search words, and URL parameters, which are
significant information for digital forensics, can
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be confirmed. In special cases, if the search
word information is encoded in unfamiliar
characters, this tool provides a decoding
function.
Other researchers have explored memory
forensics in relation to private browsing mode;
however, in both cases of private browsing and
private portable browsing, the process of RAM
forensics and the objective remain the same,
which is maintaining privacy of the user. For
this reason, we briefly review some of the
important memory forensics research findings
here.
Mahendrakar, et al. (2010) examined
various popular web browsers in private mode
to determine traces of browsing activities that
remain in physical memory. They created a
website which contained individual pages that
required the browser to interact with various
types of data including SSL certificates, form
passwords, form text entries, HTML files,
JPEG files, and cookies. Since they used their
own memory parser tool, which is not publicly
available, and their experiment was performed
in a controlled research setting environment,
their result cannot be replicated.
Said, et al. (2011) examined the content of
the volatile memory after a private browsing
session and found artifacts left in memory
about user activities. Private-mode browsing
has also been studied by Satvat, et al. (2014).
In their experiment, after navigating a few
websites in private mode and closing the
session, they discovered traces of private
navigation in RAM. The researchers did not
disclose the details of RAM forensics tools and
methodologies and thus their findings cannot
be proved by replication.
In a study of physical memory forensics,
Hejazi, et al. (2009) proposed a new technique
for extracting sensitive information from
physical memory. Their technique is based on
analyzing the Call Stack and the security
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sensitive Application Program Interfaces
(API). They implemented this technique as
part of memory analysis plug-in, which takes a
memory image file and analyze the file..
A theoretical discussion of RAM forensics
tools, techniques and guidelines can be found
in (Simmons, 2009) and (Amari, 2009). The
authors discuss the way physical memory
works in Windows and Linux operating
systems as well as the types of forensically
valuable data that can be extracted from
physical memory.

RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY

Nirsoft Internet Toolscache, and cookie Viewers

history,



Firefox Portable 33.0, Google
Chrome
portable
42.0.2311.90,
Opera portable 12.7, and Safari
portable 5.1.7



FTK Imager Lite- portable version



SQLite Maestro software



WinHex



Mandiant Redline



DumpIt memory capture software

Experiment

In this section, we provide the tools,
techniques and the forensics investigation
methodologies.

Technology and Setup
In preparation for the forensics experiment, the
following tools were used.
Hardware:


One Desktop PC (4GB RAM) for
forensics workstation activities



Four other Desktop PC
RAM) for suspect activities



Four USB Flash Drive
portable browsers



Four USB External Drive (8GB)
for captured RAMs



SATA to USB adaptor



USB write blocker

(4GB

(8GB) for

Software:


Microsoft Windows 7, Pro 32 bits,
SP1



DaemonFSfile
monitoring software



Paragon DiskWipe v 12
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integrity

We started by uninstalling the OS from all
four PCs and installed Windows 7 fresh. Then
we installed DaemonFS (2015), which is a tool
that monitors in real-time files on the hard
disk. We installed several tools from NirSoft
(2015) on the PCs for viewing history, cache,
and cookie. Next, we used Paragon Disk Wiper
(2015) to wipe all USB flash and external
drives. The flash drives were installed with a
free utility program called PortableApps
(2015). This utility allows you to run different
programs from a flash drive, similar to an OS
Start menu. Subsequently, we installed the
portable web browsers on the USB flash drives
and connected the flash drives to the suspect
PCs. We also attached the write-blocker to the
suspect machines. We should note that the
only browser on each machine was the portable
browser, and there were no installed browsers.
At this point we were ready to do the webbrowsing activities. Each portable browser was
individually launched in private-mode followed
by the same series of web-activities, i.e. log in
to email and bank account, sending/receiving
email, searching for images and videos,
uploading and downloading files and streaming
videos.

© 2016 ADFSL
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Using
the
DeamonFS
(2015)
and
NirLauncher, a Nirsoft tool (2015), we
examined temp, recent, Chache.dll, and cookies
with the aim of finding footprints of portable
browsing activities. Our experiment showed
that in all four browsers, after the USB flash
drive was removed from the suspect machine,
most of the browsing activities information was
created, modified, and then deleted from the
host machine (see Table 1). This observation is
consistent with the results reported by Ohana
and Shashidhar (2013). Table 1 entries show
that portable Firefox and portable Opera
provide slightly more privacy than portable
Chrome and portable Safari. This is because
with portable Chrome we were able to see
some account login information. Similarly, use
of Safari leaves traces of email communication
activities. We repeated the RAM forensics
process to verify the validity of the results but
the same results were obtained the second time
as well.
Table 1
Retrieved portable browsing artifacts

Portable
Browser
Google
Chrome

Firefox
Safari

Opera

Suspect machine
Activity
temp, recent, and Cache.dll created
and then deleted.
some account login info and
downloaded files created but not
deleted
temp, recent, and.Cache.dll created
and then deleted
temp, recent.Cache.dll created and
then deleted
for email login we noticed that some
Appdata/Ntuser.dat modified on host
machine but not deleted
temp, recent, and Cache.dll created
and then deleted

Next, we used a Registry editor to examine
Windows Registry. Table 2 shows portable
browsing information retrieved by examining
the Registry.

© 2016 ADFSL
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Table 2
Portable browsing artifacts retrievable from Registry

Portable
Browser
Google
Chrome

Firefox

Safari

Opera

Registry report of host
machine activity
Flash drive vendor ID, product
ID, version, serial number, drive
letter,
URLs
visited
were
retrievable.
Some registry keys was created
but deleted after the browsers
was removed
Flash drive vendor ID, product
ID, version, serial number, drive
letter,
URLs
visited
was
retrievable. The time/date the
browser launched was also visible
Flash drive vendor ID, product
ID, version, serial number, drive
letter,
URLs
visited
were
retrievable.
Flash drive vendor ID, product
ID, version, serial number, drive
letter,
URLs
visited
was
retrievable. The time/date the
browser launched was also visible

Table 2 entries show information such as
flash drive vendor ID, product ID, serial
number, the URL history and date/time the
browsers were launched. These are important
evidential information for computer forensics
investigators. This data establishes a link
between the suspect and browsing activities;
however, we were not able to see the details of
browsing activities such as browsing history,
cookies, search items, etc. This indicates that
although examination of the Registry data is
very useful, it is not sufficient.
We also analyzed the SQLite database
which stores user-defined records in large
tables. Examination of this database shows no
details of web-surfing activities. Table 3 shows
the activities on the host machine reported by
SQLite database. As can be seen from the
entries, there are no privacy differences
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between the portable web browsers with which
we experimented.

creating these tools can be found in Redline
user manual.

Table 3
SQLite report of portable browsing session

The experiment consisted of two parts. In
the first part, after a portable browsing
session, we left the portable browser flash drive
attached to the suspect machine, captured, and
analyzed the RAM. In the second part, we
removed the portable browser flash drive,
captured the RAM, and analyzed it. RAM
capture in the latter part is very time sensitive
and it depends on the time gap between
removal of portable browser flash drive and
RAM capture. Since Redline Collector cannot
collect information about terminated processes
and closed files, we also used WinHex (2015)
Hexadecimal editor.

Portable
Suspect machine
Browser
Activity
Google Chrome cookies.sqlite-wal, places.sqlite-shm,
and webappsstore.sqlite-shm were
deleted
profile/*.db were modified
Firefox
cookies.sqlite-wal, places.sqlite-shm,
and webappsstore.sqlite-shm were
deleted
profile/*.db were modified
Safari
cookies.sqlite-wal, places.sqlite-shm,
and webappsstore.sqlite-shm were
deleted
profile/*.db were modified
Opera
cookies.sqlite-wal, places.sqlite-shm,
and webappsstore.sqlite-shm were
deleted
profile/*.db were modified

For RAM forensics we followed the
framework suggested by Ghafarian (2015). We
chose an open source memory forensics tool
called Redline (2015) for the following reasons:


Graphical User Interface



Selection option which allows user
to choose only browsing related
processes and disabling all the other
processes and files



Allow to import memory analysis
results to a file such as MS Word
for offline processing



Easy to user and having
comprehensive user manual.

a

In Redline, the RAM capture tool is called
‘Collector’ and the RAM analysis is called
‘Memoryze.’ We created the Collector software
and saved it on a USB external drive. We also
created the Memoryze and saved it on the
Forensics workstation machine. The details of
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RAM Forensics Process
To make data extracting less cumbersome, we
cleared all cookies, cache, history, bookmarks,
etc that may have been left on the suspect
machines from our earlier experiment. We
installed Memoryze software on the forensics
workstation. To simplify analysis, we disabled
physical address extension mode on Redline.
We ran Redline, created the RAM capture
software Collector, and saved it on a wiped
USB external drive. Then we followed the
below steps:
1. Attached the portable browser flash
drive to the suspect machine and
configured the browsers as the default
browser with extensions and plug-ins
disabled. Then we performed a
browsing session, attached the Collector
external drive to the suspect machine,
captured RAM, saved the file onto the
external drive and removed external
drive for RAM analysis.
2. Step 1 was repeated for all the other
suspect
machines
with
different
portable browser.
3. We repeated steps 1 and 2 above, but
this time we removed the portable
© 2016 ADFSL
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browser flash drive and immediately
captured the RAM and saved it to the
external drive.
4. Configured Memoryze to retrieve only
browsing-related
information
and
processes. This action reduced the
amount and time of data analysis. We
imported the memory parsed data to a
MS Word file for offline analysis. We
should note that Redline only provide
information about running processes
and programs that were running before
memory was captured. We also used
WinHex to retrieve residual data on
these processes and files.
5. Step 4 was repeated for the other three
captured RAM files.
Over all, we had four RAM captured files
for the cases when portable browsers flash
drives were still attached to the suspect
machine during the RAM capture process. And
four captured RAM files for the case when
portable storage flash drives were removed
after each browsing session. The total memory
files that we captured were eight. Considering
each RAM capture took on average one hour,
we spent eight hours to capture the memory of
the suspect machines. The process of memory
capture and analysis were performed according
to the forensics investigations rules and
regulations. The results are discussed in the
next section.

RESULTS
Retrievable computer forensics artifacts after a
portable browsing session via memory forensics
for all four browsers are summarized in Table
4. The blue columns represent artifacts
retrieved when the portable browsers flash
drives were still attached to the machines
when RAMs were captured. The pink columns
represent retrieved data when the portable
browser flash drives were removed from the
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suspect machines and immediately RAMs were
captured.
The blue entries in Table 4 show that with
the exception of email password everything else
was retrievable. That means that if the
portable USB flash drive is attached to the
machine during RAM capture, portable
browser provides no privacy at all. In this case,
the information that was retrieved from
memory is enough to conclude browsing
activities and establishing link between the
web browsing activities and the suspect. For
example, browsing history, search history, and
file downloads were retrieved from memory for
all of the portable browsers we studied. These
are important evidential information for
computer-forensics investigators.
However, when we removed the portable
browser from the PC and then captured RAM,
the forensics artifacts retrieved from main
memory slightly varies among various
browsers. This variation is discussed below.
For Mozilla Firefox, analysis of the
memory dumped file showed considerable
browser-related entries in memory indicating
web browser activity. We were able to detect
email communication details, browsing and
URL history, search history, and downloaded
files (documents, images, and videos). On one
hand, some information such as cookies, email
password, timelines, and process ID could not
be retrieved. We also used Winhex to analyze
the captured RAM, but did not find any of
aforementioned data. This indicates that when
the portable browser flash drives were
removed, some of the browsing information
was removed from the memory.
Similar results were observed for Opera.
Analysis of the RAM showed that portable
browser flash drive removal had an effect on
the amount of data retrievable from memory.
Similar to Firefox cookies, timelines, email
passwords, and process ID were deleted before
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we captured RAM. This is because once the
portable browser flash drive is removed, the
data structure tree that handles cookies, for
example, are not accessible. On the other
hand, we were able to identify HTML data
containing various types of information
including the SSL certificate for accessing a
secure website, URL, file downloaded and
more.

Chrome portable left the
artifacts on the host machine.

most

residual

For Safari, the amount of retrieved data
from portable browsing session is identical to
Firefox and Opera. That means cookies,
timeline, and email password were not
retrievable from main memory. However, like
Firefox, we were able to see forensicallyvaluable information such as history, file
downloads, SSL certificates, etc.

Analysis of physical memory for portable
Google Chrome revealed forensically valuable
artifacts such as Certificate, HTML text file,
URL history, and files downloaded. We should
note that only Google Chrome saved process
ID in memory. Nevertheless, similar to Firefox,
we were not able to see cookies, email
passwords, and timeline. Analysis of the
retrieved artifacts indicates that Google

In an attempt to validate the retrieved
data from main memory, we used another open
source software tool from Microsoft called
DumpIt to capture the physical memory after
a browsing session. Then we used WinHex to
analyze the captured images. The results for
both Redline and DumpIt were identical.

Table 4
Results of Installed Browser, and Portable Browsers
Data Item
Firefox
Opera
Chrome
Safari
Firefox
Opera
Chrome
Safari
Removed Removed Removed Removed Attached Attached Attached Attached
Browser
process
URL History
Cookies
File downloads
Timelines
Browser
history
Email
password
Email ID
SSL Certificate
Search history

-

-

√

-

√

√

√

√

√
−
√
−
√

√
−
√
−
√

√
−
√
√
√

√
−
√
−
√

√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√

−

−

−

−

−

−

−

−

√
√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√

Analysis of the Results
Interpretation of the data captured from
memory indicate that portable browsing mode
does leave browsing evidence, even after the
browser flash drives were removed from the
machine in all four web browsers under this
experiment. The type and the amount of data
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varied slightly among the browsers. For
example, Table 4 above shows that the
Timeline and process ID are retrievable with
portable Google Chrome. Also, Figure 1 shows
the date, time, and the site that was visited.
Among all the browsers in our study, Google
Chrome portable left the most residual
artifacts on the host machine.
© 2016 ADFSL
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Examination of temp, recent, Cache.dll
showed browser activity, but all the data were
deleted immediately (see Table 1). Windows
Registry showed flash drive information such
as vendor ID, product ID, serial number, etc.
This information establishes a link between the
suspect
and
the
browsing
activities.
Examination of the SQLite database also
showed some information about cookies but
not sufficient to establish conclusion. SQLite
database revealed other data such as
profile/*.db.
Additionally, we have employed the
Ipconfig/displaydns command. Issuing this
command will generate the site address and
the IP addresses of the sites visited even after
the browser media is removed but keeps
changing. For example, Figures 1 and 2 show
the site visited with its IP address; however,
closure of the browser causes the time-to-live
to be reduced from 42 to 7 seconds and thus
the forensics investigator should be quick on
recording the data. This observation indicates
that the speed of capturing RAM after the
portable browser flash drive removal from the
PC is important.

CDFSL Proceedings 2016

Figure 1. Process Time To Live shows 42

Figure 2. Process Time To Live shows 7

Figure 3. Memory analysis reveals the date and time when the user access the site

© 2016 ADFSL
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CONCLUSIONS
We used both static media forensics and RAM
forensics to experimentally examine privacy
feature of portable Firefox, Opera, Chrome,
and Safari browsers when they are used in
private mode. We found that through a
combination of RAM forensics, Registry,
SQLite database, temp, recent, Cache.dllfile
and folders, we can retrieve forensicallyvaluable information about suspect’s activity,
such as sites visited, Internet searches, secure
sites login credentials, and traces of email
communication even after the portable
browsers flash drive were removed from the
machine. The artifacts such as flash drive
vendor ID, product ID, version, serial number,
drive letter, and URLs visited are enough to
constitute a link between the data and the
suspect. Our experiment shows that the
vendor’s claim of privacy can be nullified
through a combination of various computerforensics investigations. Among portable
browsers under our experiment, Google
Chrome portable left the most residual
artifacts on the host machine.

Forensics Analysis of Privacy of Portable Web …
for analyzing the volatile memory for data
about terminated processes and closed files and
programs. Second, repeat the same experience
with different tool such as Volatility. Third,
extract information over an extended period of
time instead of one specified browsing session.
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Due to the dynamic nature of physical
memory, the time gap between removing the
portable browser flash media from the machine
and capturing RAM is very important. The
greater the time gap spent causes a greater
chance of losing data in RAM.
Also, when the browsers are closed, we can
retrieve the last information saved on the
clipboard and analyze it for possible evidential
information.
Finally, we believe the Registry is a good
source for retrieving portable browsing
artifacts when it is used along with memory
forensics.

FUTURE WORK
This research can be extended in several ways;
first, determine better tools and methodologies
Page 192
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